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Demanding tasks often require a series of decisions
to reach a goal. Recent progress in perceptual deci-
sion-making has served to unite decision accuracy,
speed, and confidence in a common framework of
bounded evidence accumulation, furnishing a plat-
form for the study of such multi-stage decisions. In
many instances, the strategy applied to each deci-
sion, such as the speed-accuracy trade-off, ought
to depend on the accuracy of the previous decisions.
However, as the accuracy of each decision is often
unknown to the decision maker, we hypothesized
that subjects may carry forward a level of confidence
in previous decisions to affect subsequent decisions.
Subjects made two perceptual decisions sequen-
tially and were rewarded only if they made both
correctly. The speed and accuracy of individual deci-
sions were explained by noisy evidence accumula-
tion to a terminating bound. We found that subjects
adjusted their speed-accuracy setting by elevating
the termination bound on the second decision in pro-
portion to their confidence in the first. The findings
reveal a novel role for confidence and a degree of
flexibility, hitherto unknown, in the brain’s ability to
rapidly and precisely modify the mechanisms that
control the termination of a decision.
INTRODUCTION
Difficult decisions arise through a process of deliberation
involving the accumulation of evidence acquired over time.
They thus invite a trade-off between speed and accuracy, instan-
tiated as a rule for terminating the decision and committing to a
choice [1, 2]. The speed-accuracy trade-off established through
this rule is influenced by the cost of time weighed against
the reward for an accurate decision and the penalty for an error
[3–5]. In many instances, the regime is established through
instruction, expertise, or some broad optimization goal, such
as maximizing reward over time. In less certain environments,Current Biology 26, 3157–3168, Decem
This is an open access article undhowever, decision policy may benefit from adjustment on a
shorter timescale [6–8]. For example, when a decision maker
must complete two (or more) choices to achieve a goal, the pol-
icy applied on the second choicemight be adjusted based on the
prediction about the success of the first decision. These types of
multi-stage decisions arise in foraging, exploration, and struc-
tured reasoning (e.g., [9, 10]).
Recent studies of single-stage perceptual decisions have
served to unite decision accuracy, speed, and confidence in
a common framework of bounded evidence accumulation
[11–14]. The quantitative features of this model system provide
a framework for studyingmulti-stage decisions. In a well-studied
motion discrimination task, the decision itself (e.g., up or down) is
governed by the accumulation of noisy samples of evidence
from the visual stimulus and transduced by sensory neurons
[15, 16]. The accumulation is represented by neurons in the
association cortex such that their firing rate is proportional to
the accumulated evidence for one choice versus the other.
This representation, termed a decision variable, is compared to
a threshold (i.e., bound), which terminates the decision process,
thereby establishing both the choice and decision time. The
latter corresponds to the measured reaction time, but there are
processing delays that separate these events by enough time
to allow for a dissociation between the state of accumulated
evidence used to terminate the decision and the evidence
used to support subsequent behaviors, including a change of
mind [17–19].
Confidence is informed by an implicit mapping between the
state of the neural representation of accumulated evidence
used to make the decision and the likelihood that it would sup-
port a correct choice [11, 20]. Since confidence can also un-
dergo revision after commitment [13, 21, 22], it is possible for a
subject to make a decision and believe that she made an error.
Confidence thus conforms to an internal prediction about the
success or failure of one’s decisions. Often when a sequence
of multiple decisions are required to achieve a single goal, the
success of each decision is not known until the goal is reached,
if ever. Therefore, as accuracy is not known, confidence is likely
to play an important role in situations that require a sequence of
decisions to reach a goal.
Here we test the hypothesis that confidence is carried forward
from a decision to control the speed-accuracy trade-off of a
second decision. Subjects made a multi-stage decision thatber 5, 2016 ª 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. 3157
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm
All trials started with central fixation (red
circles show eye position). On double-decision
trials, subjects judged the perceived direction
of motion (left versus right) of a central random-
dot display and, whenever ready, made an
eye movement to one of two corresponding
choice targets. After fixation, a second random-
dot display appeared, and subjects judged
the perceived direction of motion (up versus
down) and made an eye movement to the cor-
responding final-choice target. After indicating
their confidence that both decisions were correct,
they received feedback on whether the selected
final-choice target was correct. On single first
decision trials, only the left-right choice targets
were displayed and a single first decision was
required, followed by the confidence judge-
ment. On single second decision trials, only one
lateral choice target and the corresponding final-
choice targets were displayed. Subjects made
an eye movement to the lateral choice target,
mimicking a first decision. Then the motion display
appeared, leading to D2*. On single-decision
catch trials, the setup was the same as on double-
decision trials, but all targets disappeared after
the first decision and subjects then made a confidence judgement and the trial was terminated. Note that for visualization purposes, stimuli in this
figure are not to scale and the confidence bar is not displayed at its true location (see Experimental Procedures).involved two perceptual decisions separated briefly in time, and
success required both decisions to be correct. We measured
choice and reaction time of both, and we extracted an estimate
of confidence in the first decision. Subjects elevated their termi-
nation criterion on the second decision in proportion to their con-
fidence in the first decision. Therefore, when they were more
confident in their first decision, they took more time and were
more accurate on their second decision, choosing a more con-
servative termination criterion when building on a successful
foundation. We show that this strategy is rational if the time to
make a decision is costly. Our results therefore point to a more
general capacity to adjust decision-making on a fast timescale,
based on the confidence one has in a previous decision.
RESULTS
Three naive subjects were asked to decide about the net direc-
tion of motion in a dynamic random-dot display (Figure 1). Both
the direction (e.g., left or right) and the strength of motion were
random from trial to trial, and the subjects indicated their deci-
sion by making an eye movement to one or the other choice
target, whenever ready, thereby providing a measure of reaction
time. The random dot display was extinguished once the eye
movement was initiated. On most trials (Figure 1 top row), the
first decision (D1st) led to the display of a new random dot
display, centered at the location of the first chosen target. The
subject was then required to make a second decision (D2nd)
about the direction of motion (up or down), again indicated
by an eye movement, when ready. The direction and motion
strength of D1st and D2nd were both random and independently
chosen. Feedback was provided only after both decisions
were made. If either choice was an error, the entire sequence
was designated as such. In other words, both decisions were3158 Current Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016required to be correct for success on the trial (see Experimental
Procedures). These double-decision trials (D1st then D2nd)
constituted 79% of the trials. The others comprised a variety of
single decisions (Figure 1), most of which were explicitly cued
as such. Subjects thus knew that success on these trials rested
on just one correct decision. Subjects performed a fixed number
of trials each session.
All three subjects made faster and more accurate decisions
when they viewed stronger motion. Figure 2 illustrates these
trends in the data for the first decision. The data are well
captured by a bounded drift-diffusion model (smooth curves),
as previously shown [15, 23, 24]. On trials in which we did not
present a second stimulus, we obtained a confidence rating after
the subject indicated their choice (Figure 2, bottom row) but
before receiving feedback. Not surprisingly, decisions were
associated with greater confidence if they were correct, with
the highest confidence associated with the strongest motion.
Note that the confidence rating was obtained after the choice
(cf. [12]) and therefore likely benefited from information in the
display that did not arrive in time to affect the choice [13]. We
hypothesized that confidence about the first decision could
bear on the strategy used to make a second decision. We next
consider the changes in strategy that arise when making two
decisions in sequence, beginning with the first decision.
First of Two Decisions
Faced with a decision, it is possible that a decision maker might
apply a different strategy if she knows ahead of time that this
is the first of a sequence or the sole decision that will affect
outcome. To evaluate this possibility, we examine choice accu-
racy and reaction times (RTs) under conditions in which the
subject was explicitly instructed that they would make only a
single first decision (Figure 2, blue curves) and compared these
Figure 2. Accuracy, Reaction Time, and Confidence for First Decisions
The top andmiddle rows show the proportion of correct decisions and reaction times as a function of motion strength on single first decisions (blue: D1* trials) and
on first decisions on trials in which subjects made (or thought they would make) two decisions (red: D1st and D1st-catch trials). Solid lines are fits of a drift-diffusion
model to each dataset. The bottom row shows the confidence ratings on correct (filled) and error (open) trials for both single first decision (blue: D1*) and single-
decision catch trials (red: D1st-catch). Note that 0% trials have been designated as correct for plotting. Columns S1–S3 correspond to individual subjects. Error bars
show SEM. See also Figure S1 and Table S1.to performance when the subject believed that the decision was
the first of two (Figure 2, red curves). We observed only subtle
differences in decision accuracy, which were not statistically
reliable (p > 0.36). Two subjects exhibited shorter RTs on the
single-decision trials (reduction of S2: 90 ms; p < 0.001; reduc-
tion of S3: 60 ms; p = 0.025 ANOVA). The drift-diffusion model
attributes this to a small change in k and non-decision time
(Table S1). Note that this difference is not explained by a change
in the termination criteria, that is, the bound height, which would
lead to larger differences in the RTs at the lower coherences—a
pattern that will be apparent in the next section.
From this analysis, we are unable to draw strong conclusions
about a change in decision policy induced by the need to
make two decisions in sequence. The data do not rule out this
potential strategy, but it was not exercised to great effect in
this experiment. The observation is mainly interesting when
contrasted with the subjects’ adjustments to their decision
criteria in the second of two decisions. It will also prove conve-
nient when we exploit confidence ratings from the single first
decisions later on.Second of Two Decisions
Both the accuracy and RT of the second decision depended on
the experience of the first decision (Figure 3). For example, if the
first decision resulted in an error, subjects were faster and less
accurate on their second decision (Figure 3A, red traces) than
they were if the first decision was correct (blue traces). The
breakdown of the second decision by whether the first was cor-
rect or an error implies that aspects of the first decision may
affect the second decision. However, as subjects did not receive
feedback until completion of the two decisions, they could not
know if they were correct or not when they entered the second
decision. We hypothesized that they carried forward their confi-
dence after the first decision—an internal prediction or belief that
they were correct [6, 11, 25]—to adjust criteria applied to make
the second decision.
Before evaluating this hypothesis in detail, it is important to
consider plausible alternatives. Specifically, slow fluctuations
in attention or any other factors that affect the speed-accuracy
trade-off on both the first and second decisions could produce
an association between the accuracy of the first decision andCurrent Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016 3159
Figure 3. Accuracy and Reaction Time for Second Decisions
(A) Data plotted against motion strength onD2nd. Trials are split bywhether the first decision was correct (blue) or an error (red). The black data points are for single
second decisions (D2*). Columns S1–S3 correspond to individual subjects, and solid lines are fits of a drift-diffusion model to each dataset.
(B) Reaction time plotted as a function of the motion strength of the first decision (D1st) for all trials (top) and split (bottom) by whether the D1st decision was correct
(blue) or an error (red). The final black data points are for trials with a single second decision (D2*).
Error bars show SEM. See also Figures S2, S3, and S5.performance on the second. We know that such fluctuations
exist in our data (Figures S1 and S2). Therefore, by selecting er-
ror trials, we might have also selected trials in which the second
decision tended to be faster and less accurate due to a common
cause (fluctuations in the decision-making process across the
two decisions). However, co-fluctuations cannot explain three
additional observations. First, the difficulty (motion strength) of
D1st affected both the accuracy (p < 0.01 for all subjects) and
reaction times on D2nd (Figure 3B top; p < 0.0001 for all sub-
jects). The difficulty is independent of any such co-fluctuations
because the motion strength of D1st and D2nd were uncorrelated.
Second, subjects performed single decisions similarly to the
second of two decisions preceded by the easiest motion
strength. We examined a set of trials in which subjects made
just one decision using the identical task geometry as the second
of a sequence of decisions (labeled D2* in Figure 1). As these de-
cisions are not selected based on the performance on a previous3160 Current Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016decision, the effect of fluctuations should produce RTs repre-
sented by a mixture of the D2nd RTs accompanying errors and
correct D1st choices. The black traces in Figure 3A should there-
fore lie between the redandblue traces, but thiswasnot the case.
In fact, for all subjects, RTs were longest on these single deci-
sions (p < 0.001 for all subjects). The force of this observation
rests on the assumption that the processes underlying D2* and
D2nd decisions are similar, as they appear to be. Separate fits of
the drift-diffusionmodel to D2* and D2nd trials show no significant
difference in the signal-to-noise and non-decision time parame-
ters (p > 0.3 for all subjects and parameters). In fact, the RTs
on D2* resemble the RTs on D2nd when the latter were preceded
by the strongest motion on D1st (Figure 3B bottom; p > 0.41 all
subjects). Intuitively, this is because a D2* decision, in which the
subject only needed to get this decision correct for a reward, is
similar to a D2nd decision where the subject would be certain
that the first decision was correct (e.g., highest coherence).
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Reaction time (s)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Co
nf
id
en
ce
 ra
tin
g
S1
51.2
25.6
12.8
6.4
3.2
0
%coherence
correct=thick
error=thin
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Reaction time (s)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
S2
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Reaction time (s)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
S3 Figure 4. Confidence Ratings for Single
First Decisions Vary with Motion Strength
and Reaction Time
D1* and D1st-catch trials are depicted. Line colors
indicate motion coherence; line thickness in-
dicates correct (thick) versus incorrect (thin) trials.
All 0% coherence trials are designated as correct
for plotting. Data are plotted as a running average
(over 70 points for correct trials and 25 points
for the fewer error trials).Third, these sequential effects were only present when the two
decisions were part of a single multi-stage decision, rather than
just temporally adjacent. We performed the same analysis as in
Figure 3B (top) but examined sequential decisions occurring
across trials (Figure S3). This showed that the RT on the first
decision of one trial is not significantly affected by the coherence
of the decision that preceded it, that is, the last decision of the
previous trial (p > 0.19 for all subjects). This analysis provides
reassurance that the effect we report depends on the grouping
of the two decisions as part of the same two-stage decision pro-
cess leading to a reward only if both decisions are correct. From
theses analyses (Figures 3B and S3), we conclude that the
observed changes in the second of two decisions are not ex-
plained by factors common to both decisions or by sequential
effects unrelated to performing the multi-stage decision task.
Instead, it is an aspect of the experience of the first decision
that affects the way the subjects approach the second. We
next evaluate our hypothesis that the critical aspect of the first
decision is the prediction that the first decision was correct.
Figure 4 shows the confidence ratings obtained after ‘‘single
first decisions’’ (see Figure 1). The confidence rating is an arbi-
trary scaling, but it is significantly influenced by motion strength
(p < 0.0001, all subjects), RT (p < 0.0001), and accuracy (p <
0.005), as previously shown [13, 20]. We did not ask the subjects
to report their confidence on D1st before making D2nd because
we did not want to interfere with the sequential decision. Instead,
we estimated their confidence on D1st trials by interpolation, us-
ing the coherence, RT, accuracy, and confidence data from
the single first decisions (D1* and D1st-catch; see Experimental
Procedures). We have three reasons to believe that this method
provided accurate confidence estimates for D1st decisions. First,
subjects performed similarly on D1* and D1st trials. Second, the
confidence ratings obtained onD1* andD1st-catch trials (Figure 3B)
were either indistinguishable (p > 0.86 for S1 and S2) orminimally
different (p = 0.044 for S3; average difference in rating of 0.03;
5% of the range; see Figure 4). Finally, using leave-one-out
cross-validation, our interpolation method accounts for 0.68,
0.56, and 0.46 of the variance in each subject’s confidence
ratings on D1* and D1st-catch trials.
We then asked how the confidence affects the parameters of a
diffusion model fit to the choice-RT data from the second deci-
sion. We compared six models summarized in Table S2. TheCurrent Biologbest-fitting model (model 3) allows the
termination bound, B, to scale with confi-
dence, after controlling for variation in this
parameter across days of data collection.
This model was superior to alternativesthat allowed drift rate and bound to vary by different combina-
tions of session and/or confidence. Model comparison showed
that allowing the bound height on D2nd to vary linearly with con-
fidence on D1st had overall very strong support (decrease in
Bayesian information criterion [BIC] of 140.9, 46.9, and 4.8
relative to the next best model; designations very strong for S1
and S2 and positive for S3 [26, 27]).
Coherence is a strong determinant of confidence, although the
latter is also influenced by choice accuracy and time (Figure 4).
We performed a model comparison with the same six models
replacing confidence by coherence. The results again favor a
bound change (model 3, decrease in BIC of 95.6, 41.3, and 6.0
relative to the next best model). Moreover, confidence was
preferred over coherence for this model for two of the three sub-
jects (DBIC in favor of confidence of 54.1, 8.7, 4.9). The weak
support for coherence (S3) is probably explained by our own
limited ability to predict confidence for this subject (see the
cross-validation exercise above). Combining BICs across sub-
jects lends strong support for confidence (DBIC 58.0; see
Experimental Procedures).
Figure 5 depicts the model’s change in bound height as a
function of the estimated confidence. The dashed line shows
the best-fit solution, which is based on the individual trials. To
examine our model assumption that bound height varied linearly
with confidence, we also fit a model in which we grouped the
trials into seven quantiles based on the confidence estimates
of D1st (approximately 495 trials per quantile) and allowed the
bound height to vary for each quantile when fitting the drift-diffu-
sion model to D2nd. The error bars are standard errors of the es-
timate of the percentage change in B relative to the average
bound across all trials for the lowest-confidence quantile. The
dashed line is not a fit to these points—the points and their
standard errors simply support our choice of a linear effect of
estimated confidence on the change in B. The fits to accuracy
and mean RT for four of the quantiles (odd ones) are displayed
in Figure 6. They are reasonably good (R2 range is 0.87 to 0.99
for RT across subjects and all quantiles). From these analyses,
we conclude that subjects adjust their criterion on a second de-
cision by slowing down if they are confident on the first decision,
and they do so by adjusting the criterion for terminating a deci-
sion. This conclusion is further supported by an analysis of the
0%coherence D2nd and D2* trials, in which only the bound heighty 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016 3161
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Figure 5. Estimates of the Change in the Bound on the Second Decision as a Function of the Estimated Confidence about the First Decision
The dashed lines depict the best model (model 3). The circles are obtained from amodel fit separately to seven quantiles (collapsing over sessions), based on the
estimated confidence from the D1st decision. The changes in bound are relative to the lowest-quantile data point (hence no error bar). The dashed line is displaced
to match the mean of the quantile fits, as its offset but not slope is arbitrary. See also Figure S4 and Table S2. Error bars indicate SE.(and non-decision time) determines reaction time. We estimated
the bound heights for these second decisions for four quartiles
based on D1st confidence and found they were very similar to
those from our best-fitting model (Figure S4).
The finding that confidence on one decision affects the bound
on the next might explain why subjects adopted conservative
bounds on their first decisions (i.e., slow speed, high accuracy;
compare Figure 2 and Figure 3) compared with their second.
This seems like a sensible strategy because first decisions begin
with no sense of futility. They are like second decisions made
with the highest confidence on D1st, or like the D2* control. To
examine this further empirically, we examined the mean RTs
on 0% coherence motion trials; on these trials, decision time is
primarily determined by bound height [28]. As expected, for all
subjects, the mean RT from D1st decisions was similar to the
mean RT on D2* decisions (Figure S5; p > 0.11 for each subject),
which naturally start with highest confidence.
The previous results indicate that subjects adjusted the criteria
for terminating a second decision based on confidence in the
first decision. The scheme in Figure 7A conveys an intuition for
why this may be a sensible strategy. Allocating more time to
D2nd (i.e., by changing the termination criteria) increases the
reward expected from solving the task correctly (dashed lines).
When the confidence in the first decision is low (green), the ex-
pected reward plateaus at a lower value than when confidence
is high (black), because the expected reward is contingent on
having responded correctly to the first decision. The optimal pol-
icy (solid line) must balance the marginal benefit expected by
deferring the decision against the cost of time and effort (dotted
line). Because the marginal benefits are lower following low-
confidence first decisions, the optimal decision time for D2nd is
shorter if the confidence in D1st is low. This explanation is simple3162 Current Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016and intuitive, but it is only an approximation of the optimal policy,
assuming a cost of time in our task.
We used dynamic programming (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures) to determine whether and how a rational
decision maker would adjust the bounds for the second decision
of a double-decision task if there is a cost associated with
the passage of time. There are many ways in which time
can be penalized in such tasks. For simplicity, we chose to
examine the normative solution that maximizes reward rate.
As has been shown previously for tasks with a single decision,
maximizing reward rate [4] or an arbitrary utility function [29]
requires adjusting the height of the bound with elapsed time.
These previous studies have only considered single decisions,
so we extend their framework to our multi-stage decision in
which we examine how the bounds should be set given the
confidence in D1st.
The normative model prescribes that higher confidence in the
D1st decision should lead to higher bounds for the D2nd decision
(Figure 7B). The most notable effect of the confidence in D1st
is a change in the offset of the bounds for D2nd, without a strong
influence on the shape of the bounds. The psychometric and
chronometric functions shown in Figure 7C were derived from
simulations of diffusion processes using the dynamic program-
ming solution (Figure 7B). Note the resemblance to the corre-
sponding curves in Figure 3A. Specifically, accuracy and RTs
were lowest following incorrect first decisions, intermediate
following correct first decisions, and highest when the first deci-
sion was bypassed. The range of these effects is comparable to
what was observed in the behavioral data. To examine the gen-
erality of this solution, we also derived the optimal bounds for a
range of time costs (equivalent to changing the slope of the cost-
of-time lines in Figure 7A) and found qualitatively similar patterns
Figure 6. Variation in the Bound Based on D1st Confidence Explains the Accuracy and Reaction Time of D2nd Choices
As in Figure 5, data were split into seven quantiles based on the estimated confidence in the first decision. The columns show the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th quantiles
(lowest to highest). Fits (solid lines) incorporate the change in bound for corresponding quantiles from Figure 5. The red lines are the fits to the lowest quantiles of
confidence repeated on the other plots for comparison. Error bars indicate SEM. See also Table S2.of bound changes (data not shown). Therefore, all that is needed
for the pattern of bound changes we observe to be rational is a
cost of time and a benefit of points. The agreement is only in-
tended as qualitative because the analysis in Figure 7 ignores
many complexities in the actual task. Our results do indicate,
however, that the strategy exercised by our three subjects—ad-
justing the bound height for D2nd based on the confidence about
D1st—is indeed rational.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that human decision makers are capable of ad-
justing their speed-accuracy trade-off on the fly based on the
recent experience of a decision in a multi-stage decision task.The task is representative of a class of multi-stage decisions in
which the outcome depends on all steps along the way. More
elaborate cases arise in problem solving (e.g., reasoning step
by step) and navigating an uncertain environment. The task
we studied is obviously a simple example and is thus capable
of bearing on only a fraction of what these more complex
endeavors entail. Its main advantages are the consilience
with neurobiology and conformance with sequential sampling
models, based on biased random walks [1, 30] and drift diffu-
sion [2, 15, 16].
The RTs and choice accuracy in the present dataset were well
described by a parsimonious version of bounded evidence accu-
mulation, which we leveraged to gain insight into the mechanism
through which subjects used the experience from the firstCurrent Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016 3163
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Figure 7. Normative Model for D2nd
(A) Schematic illustration of the impetus to change
the strategy on a second decision, based on
the confidence in the first. The expected reward
after the D1st decision increases monotonically
with viewing duration (dashed lines). The expected
reward is lower when D1st confidence is low
(compare black and green dashed lines). With a
cost on time (dotted black line), the total reward
(solid lines) has a maximum corresponding to the
optimal decision time, which is longer following
high-confidence D1st decisions. Although this
schematic provides an intuition for our results, we
used dynamic programming to derive the optimal
solution to maximize reward rate.
(B) Optimal time-dependent bounds from dynamic
programming show that the bound height for D2nd
increases with D1st confidence.
(C) Model simulation of accuracy and reaction time
for second decisions using the optimal bounds in
(B). For comparison to Figure 3, the three levels
are comparable to a D2* decision (black: full
confidence of 1.0), correct D1st (blue: high confi-
dence of 0.8), and an error on D1st (red: low con-
fidence of 0.6).decision to alter their strategy on the second. We found clear
evidence that subjects adjusted their stopping criterion to allow
for more evidence acquisition when they began the second de-
cision with high confidence that their first decision was correct
(and hence a greater chance of being rewarded for answering
the second decision correctly). The model comparison clearly
favored this mechanism over its main alternative, which would
posit a boost in signal to noise via concentration of attention
and/or noise decorrelation [31–33]. We cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that a change in attention occurs, but the pattern of
changes in RT and accuracy are explained by a change in the
bound height, and the quality of the fits leaves little room for
further improvement.
Confidence in the first decision is associatedwith other factors
controlled by the experimenter (e.g., motion strength) or associ-
ated with the decision process (e.g., RT and accuracy). These
factors are therefore associated with the change in decision
bound on the second decision. We reason, however, that they
are mediated by the prediction that the first decision was suc-
cessful, as this establishes the upper bound for joint success
in the multi-stage decision. The model comparison lends empir-
ical support for this interpretation, assigning our derived confi-
dence estimates better leverage than motion strength, but that
is almost beside the point. Had we found that coherence and
our confidence estimates were equivalent, the effect of coher-
ence would be mediated by a process that effectively predicts
the probability that D1st is correct—that is, infers confidence.
The neural mechanism through which confidence affects the
bounds of a subsequent decision is not presently known, but
the result highlights the importance of a process that would allow
an inferential operation to control another process (e.g., termina-
tion criterion).
The particular strategy adopted by our subjects was rational in
the sense that it balances success rate against time costs. As we
show in Figure 7A, it is wise to integrate for longer on a second3164 Current Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016decision if one enters that decision with higher confidence that
the first decision was correct. This is because the expected final
reward, given a correct second choice, increases with the confi-
dence of the first decision, making the extra time invested worth-
while. Conversely, if one has low confidence or even believes
that an error was made on the first decision, there is little point
spending time on the second decision. We support this point
with the modeling exercise in Figures 7B and 7C, but we do
not claim that our subjects behaved optimally or that the exercise
captures optimality itself. It seems likely that the time costs
include opportunity costs or effort of attending the stimulus
as well as overall success rate. Nevertheless, we show that
increasing the boundwith confidence can arise from a normative
model (Figures 7B and 7C), suggesting that it is at least a
rational strategy.
We focused on the change in the second of two decisions
because we were interested in the possibility that confidence
would furnish the evidence, as it were, to adjust the controlling
parameters of the second decision. We observed little change
in the strategy that our subjects applied on the first decision,
whether they thought it was the first of a sequence or the only
decision they would make (Figure 2). We do not believe that
this will hold in general. Clearly, decision makers adopt a
different trade-off between speed and accuracy in different
contexts. What we have established is that they can do this
in a flexible manner that changes over the time course of one
second or less.
In the brain, bounds have their signature in a stereotyped level
of neural activity at a short latency before the reaction time
[15, 24]. This stereotyped level does not depend on RT or the
speed-accuracy regime [34, 35]. The brain instantiates a change
in bound height by controlling the starting point of the accu-
mulation and adding a time-dependent signal to the accumu-
lated evidence [35, 36]. This is possible because the decision
is rendered via a race between two processes, one that
accumulates evidence, say, for up and against down, and
another that accumulates evidence for down and against up
[37, 38]. These races can adjust the effective bound height by
adding the same time-dependent quantity to both accumulators,
termed ‘‘urgency’’ [36]. Upon this background, we speculate that
the neural mechanism underlying our main effect links confi-
dence in D1st to a change in urgency. Both the readout of confi-
dence and the construction of the urgency signals seem to
necessitate structures beyond those that represent the accumu-
lation of evidence. The striatum is likely to a play a role in either
or both of these processes [39–41].
The present findings expand our appreciation for the role of
confidence in a decision. Confidence is naturally portrayed as
a metacognitive assessment—an evaluation of the decision pro-
cess itself—leading to a belief or rating or a prediction of reward.
As such, confidence can be expressed as a choice, for example
to postpone action on a decision [42] and to obtain more data or
a small but certain reward [11, 43]. The present finding demon-
strates that confidence can act as a bridge, linking the outcome
of one decision to the strategy applied on a subsequent decision
(see also [6]). The process is in some ways like a decision, only
instead of deliberating toward a commitment to a proposition
among alternatives, it is toward the adoption of a policy—here
the relative value of speed versus accuracy.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Four naive subjects (three female and onemale) between the ages of 22 and 25
participated in the study. The Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Com-
mittee approved the experimental protocol, and subjects gave informed con-
sent. One of the subjects was excluded from the analyses based on poor task
performance (see below). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity and had no previous experiencewith randomdotmotion displays.
Prior to participation, they were informed that there was a fixed payment per
session. Subjects completed 10–15 sessions. The duration of test sessions
(excluding breaks) was 62.0 ± 1.0, 64.6 ± 6.3, and 58.7 ± 0.9 min (mean ±
SE) for subjects S1, S2, and S3, respectively.
Apparatus
Subjects were seated in a dimly lit room in front of a 17’’ Sony Multiscan G200
FD Trinitron CRT monitor (10243 768 resolution, 75 Hz refresh). Psychophys-
ics Toolbox [44] and Eyelink Toolbox for MATLAB [45] were used to display
images and record eye movements using an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research) in
monocular mode at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. A headrest and chinrest
ensured a viewing distance of 42 cm.
Stimulus
Subjects discriminated the direction of motion of dynamic random-dot motion
stimuli [46] presentedwithin a circular aperturewith adiameter subtending4 of
visual angle. The dots were displayed for one frame (13.3 ms), and then three
frames later a subset of these dots were displaced in the direction of motion
while the rest of the dots were displaced randomly. Thus, the positions of the
dots in frame four, say, could be correlated only with dots in frames one and/or
seven but not with dots in frames two, three, five, and six. When displacement
made a dot move off the boundary, it was replaced randomly on the opposite
boundary in such a way that the coverage of the aperture had on average uni-
form density. The dot density was 17.9 dots/deg2/s, and displacements were
consistent with a motion speed of 7.1 deg/s. The difficulty of the task was
manipulated through the coherence of the stimulus, defined as the probability
that each dot would be displaced as opposed to randomly replaced.
Procedure
The majority of trials were double-decision trials in which subjects made two
discrimination decisions: a left-right decision (D1st), indicated by a leftwardor rightward saccade, followed by an up-down decision (D2nd), at the new fix-
ation location to reach one of four final-choice targets (Figure 1A). Critically, for
success both decisions needed to be correct. We used a point system to
encourage subjects to get both decisions correct. They received no points if
either decision was incorrect. We paid subjects for the session, but not based
on points, as in general our subjects are self-motivated to accrue points.
The spatial features of the task are not essential. We chose different direc-
tions of motion for the two decisions to avoid a tendency to repeat or alternate
directions, and we found in pilot experiments that some subjects found the
task more natural when they navigated around the screen with linked deci-
sions. In particular, it made the sequence more apparent as a unit than
repeating a stimulus in the same location.
At the start of a double-decision trial, a fixation point (blue circular disc,
diameter 0.42) appeared centrally with two choice targets (identical to the fix-
ation point) left and right of the central point (6 eccentricity). In addition, final-
choice targets were present at the four possible target locations (white squares
with side length 0.42) above and below the lateral choice targets. After a
random delay, sampled from a truncated exponential distribution (range 0.3–
1.0 s; mean 0.57 s), the first motion stimulus appeared at the fixation position.
Subjects judged the direction of the motion (left versus right) and made an eye
movement to the corresponding lateral choice target when ready. Critically,
when the movement was initiated—that is, the eye was more than 2.8 from
the central point—the random-dot stimulus was extinguished. After fixation
had been established at the lateral choice target (defined as within 2.2 from
the target center) and a further delay (same distribution as that of the delay
before the first decision, which ensured full integration of the first stimulus
[17]), the second motion stimulus was presented at the chosen lateral choice
target and the subject made a second decision (up versus down) indicated by
an eye movement to a final-choice target above or below the stimulus. Again,
on saccade initiation the stimulus was extinguished.
On reaching the final-choice target, the chosen target filled. After 0.5 s delay,
a bar appeared (5 above the chosen target) within an empty horizontal rect-
angle on the screen. Subjects provided a confidence rating by rotating a
knob (Griffin PowerMate) with their hand so as to adjust the length of the bar
to show how confident they were that the final-choice target was correct.
The bar’s length varied as they rotated the knob, and a number between
0 to 100 was displayed above the bar that corresponded linearly to its length.
Subjects were asked to indicate their confidence that the final chosen target
was correct (i.e., out of four possible choice targets) by adjusting the knob
and pressing a key. Text was displayed at the two ends of the rectangle with
‘‘no clue’’ (at 0) and ‘‘absolutely sure’’ (at 100). After the confidence rating, sub-
jects received auditory feedback about whether they had chosen the correct
target.
On each trial, the stimulus coherenceswere selected randomly and indepen-
dently for each decision from the set 0%, ±3.2%, ±6.4%, ±12.8%, ±25.6%,
and ±51.2%, where negative coherences correspond to leftward/upward
motion and positive coherences to rightward/downward motion. On the 0%
coherence trials, the direction that would be rewarded was chosen randomly.
Three additional trial types were used (Figure 1, last three rows) in which
only a single motion discrimination decision was made and subjects again
gave a confidence rating (that they had chosen the correct choice target
out of the two options) before they were told whether their decision was cor-
rect. On single first decision trials (designated D1*), two choice targets were
placed where the lateral fixation points would have been, indicating that the
subject would make only a single left-right decision. On single second deci-
sion trials (designated D2*), only the final-choice targets on the left or right of
the screen were displayed, and the initial left-right motion discrimination was
not required. Subjects simply made a saccade to the left or right fixation
point before making the single second decision. Finally, we included sin-
gle-decision catch trials (designated D1st-catch), in which subjects thought
they would make two decisions (the display was identical to double-decision
trials) but were instead presented with a D1* trial: a confidence rating was
asked after the first decision, and there was no second decision. These trials
allowed us to compare confidence on single-decision trials with confidence
on the first decision on a double-decision trial.
A block of trials consisted of all combinations of double-decision coherence
pairs (11 first-stimulus coherences 3 11 second-stimulus coherences) and
each coherence for the other three trial types (11 coherences for each, makingCurrent Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016 3165
33 trials), making 154 trials in total. Subjects completed nine sessions (on
separate days) and performed four blocks in each session. Stimuli in the first
block of a session were all unique. Stimuli in the second block were mirrored
versions (horizontally or vertically as appropriate) of the stimuli in the first
block. The third and fourth blocks were identical to the first two blocks. The
order in which trials were presented was randomized in all blocks. To motivate
subjects after each block, their percentage performance over the last block
was displayed.
All subjects received extensive training over a number of days on the motion
task, in three phases: (1) D1* trials with computer-controlled variable-duration
viewing and no confidence ratings (864 trials completed in a single session), (2)
D1* and D2* trials without confidence ratings (864 trials per session until choice
and reaction times appeared stable; three sessions for subjects S1 and S2,
and five sessions for S3), and (3) double-decision trials (99 trials without
confidence ratings followed by 154 with confidence ratings). All training was
completed before the nine experimental sessions were run.
We required subjects to have sufficient perceptual skills and motivation
to perform the task. One subject became unmotivated as the sessions pro-
ceeded (failing to turn up for sessions), and an analysis of his first three ses-
sions showed that he also had very strong response bias (e.g., 90% upward
responses at 0% coherence trials), so he did not continue in the experiment
and we excluded his data from analysis.
Analysis
For each trial, we recorded the choice and reaction time (RT; time tomovement
initiation from start of motion stimulus) for each decision as well as the final
confidence rating (which we divided by 100 so as to be on a 0–1 scale).
We refer to the two decisions of the double decision as D1st and D2nd to
distinguish them from single first and single second decisions (D1* and D2*,
respectively) and the decision made on a single-decision catch trial D1st-catch.
To examine whether accuracy on D2nd is affected by the coherence on D1st,
we performed logistic regression on D2nd choices as a function of coherence
on D2nd,
PrightðD2ndÞ= ½1+ expð  ðk1 + k2 coh2 + k3 coh2jcoh1 j ÞÞ1;
with the null hypothesis that k3 = 0.
To examine whether accuracy on D2nd is affected by accuracy on D1st, we
used a chi-square test with Yates correction. To compare reaction times be-
tween conditions, we performed ANOVAs on individual subjects with reaction
time (individual trials) as a function of condition and absolute coherence (as a
categorical variable).
To examine whether the confidence rating on a first decision depended
on whether subjects expected to make second decision, we performed
ANOVAs of confidence rating with factors of trial type (D1* versus D1st-catch),
motion strength (six levels), and accuracy of D1st (correct versus error). To
examine whether the individual confidence rating on a first decision depended
on the trial’s coherence, RT, and accuracy, we performed an ANOVA on the
confidence ratings with categorical factors of unsigned coherence and accu-
racy, and linear factor RT.
By design, our task does not introduce an interruption between the first and
second decision (D1st and D2nd). Thus, we did not solicit confidence reports for
D1st and instead estimated these ratings using the D1* and D1st-catch trials. For
each D1st decision, we selected a fixed number (k) of D1* and D1st-catch trials for
the same coherence and accuracy (error versus correct) that were closest to
the D1st RT and averaged the corresponding confidence ratings (k-nearest
neighbor interpolation). We chose k = 30 for correct trials and k = 15 for error
trials because errors were less frequent than correct responses. This allowed
us to generate estimates of confidence for all D1st trials to examine how the
confidence affected D2nd on the same trial.
Naturally, confidence can vary even for trials with the same motion strength,
choice, and reaction time. We therefore examined the predictive power of our
approach with leave-one-out cross-validation on D1* and D1st-catch trials. For
each D1* and D1st-catch trial, we used the data with the same coherence and
accuracy (error versus correct) to predict the confidence on that trial (leaving
that trial out of the dataset for the k-nearest neighbor). We repeated this for
all of the trials so that we have a leave-one-out prediction of confidence for
each trial as well as the actual confidence rating on that trial. We report the
fraction of variance explained from these trials.3166 Current Biology 26, 3157–3168, December 5, 2016Model
We used a variant of the drift-diffusion model [23, 47] to explain the proportion
of choices and reaction times. The model posits that evidence accumulates
from zero until it reaches an upper or lower bound (±B), which determines
the initial choice and decision time. The increments of evidence are idealized
as normally distributed random variables with unit variance per second and
mean k(C+C0), where C is signed motion strength (specified as the proportion
of dots moving in net motion direction, positive = rightward/downward and
negative = leftward/upward motion); k, B and C0 are free parameters. The
parameters B and k explain the trade-off between speed and accuracy of
the initial choices; C0 is a coherence offset, which explains bias (if any) for
one of the choices (starting point bias versus drift bias; see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). The RT incorporates additional latencies, termed
the non-decision time (tnd), from stimulus onset to the beginning of the
bounded accumulation process and from the termination of the process to
the beginning of the motor response.
To fit the accuracy and reaction time of the D2nd and D2* choices, we mini-
mized the negative log likelihood, using Bernoulli distributions for the choices
and Gaussian distributions for the RTs. For analytic simplicity (see below), we
used a flat bound (i.e., stationary rather than collapsing), which does not cap-
ture the shape of the RT distributions and themean RT on error trials [4]. There-
fore, for the RT component of the response likelihood for each trial, we used
only the model’s predicted mean RT and used the associated standard devi-
ation from the data for correct trials for the same coherence. Absent bias, cor-
rect choices would be rightward choices for positive coherences, leftward
choices for negative coherences, and all choices for 0%coherence. In general,
these are the direction of the more numerous choices at each coherence,
including 0. In practice, we identified the correct trials, when fitting RT, by
finding the point of subjective equality in a simple logistic fit to choice and se-
lecting rightward choice trials when pright > 0.5 and leftward choice trials for
pright < 0.5. We did not use the logistic fit to estimate C0. We optimized using
the MATLAB function fmincon using analytic gradients.
We used this parsimonious version of the bounded evidence accumulation
model, which employs stationary (i.e., flat) bounds. We recognize that the
normative prescription for terminating bounds in our experiment incorporates
non-stationary (collapsing) bounds [4]. We did not incorporate this degree of
complexity in our main model fits in order to reduce complexity and to focus
on a single bound parameter (i.e., bound height). This strategy also allowed
derivation of model gradients and Hessians allowing efficient and reliable
fitting of our models. This practice provides stable estimates of the key param-
eters (B, k, tnd).
We examined the stability of the model parameters over the nine sessions
and discovered significant variation in the bound parameter (B) and more sub-
tle variation in the other parameters. Furthermore, the values of B covaried for
D1st and D2nd (Figure S1). The likelihoods associated with reaction times were
calculated using the sample standard deviation separately for each session,
subject, and coherence.
To examine how confidence in D1st affected the parameters of the drift-
diffusion process accounting for D2nd and D2* (for which confidence was
set to 1), we compared six models (Table S2). We allowed some parameters
(B and k) to vary for each session, whereas other parameters such as C0
and tnd were shared across all sessions. Table S2 lists the parameters
that vary. Here we provide a more intuitive guide. Across the six models,
the bound (B) and the signal-to-noise term (k) can vary, and they can
do so in three ways: fixed, by session, and linearly as a function of D1st con-
fidence. Models 1 and 2 are the simplest: either B or k varies with session,
but neither depends on D1st confidence. Models 3 and 4 parallel models 1
and 2, but with an additional variation of B or k linearly with D1st confidence.
Finally, models 5 and 6 allow variation in one parameter, by session, and in
the other parameter linearly with D1st confidence. We used the Bayesian in-
formation criterion (BIC) to compare the models by controlling for their
differing number of free parameters (Table S2). To compute an overall
BIC across subjects, we summed the degrees of freedom, number of trials,
and log likelihoods for each model.
We also fit a model in which we allowed the bound on D2nd to vary with the
session and also to have an additional offset for each of seven quantiles of D1st
confidence. This was used not for model comparison but for display purposes,
to confirm that our linearity assumption in model 3 (the preferred model) was
reasonable. We were able to use an analytic Hessian to obtain confidence
limits on parameters (displayed in Figure 5 and Table S1).
Model Recovery
To validate our selection of model 3 as the preferred model, we examined
whether this classification could have arisen if the data had been generated
by each of the other five non-preferred models. For each subject, we gener-
ated 100 synthetic datasets for each of the five non-preferred models using
each subject’s best-fit parameters for that model. We generated a synthetic
dataset for each model, as follows. For each trial in the experiment with a sec-
ond decision, we used the subject’s estimated D1st confidence and themotion
coherence of the stimulus for the second decision, together with the fitted pa-
rameters of the model, to generate a synthetic choice (up/down) and RT. The
variability in the 100 synthetic datasets for each subject and model arises from
the stochastic nature of the drift-diffusion process. We then fit each of the six
models to these synthetic datasets. This validation shows that very few of
these synthetic datasets had a BIC that was lower than the preferred model
type (model 3): 0.8%, 4.8%, and 1.8% for the three subjects. This suggests
that had the data come from one of the other models, it is unlikely that we
would have misclassified them as model 3.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://dx.
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